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CONTEXT
Escalating health care costs worldwide
Drive for more efficient resource allocation processes
Questions:
• which providers should receive funds?
• do institutional (ownership and governance) arrangements of 
firms matter?
NONPROFIT FIRMS AND HEALTHCARE
Absent contractual provisions, generally co-exist with 
shareholder-owned firms
• no clear evidence of superior performance of either status
A response to „missing market‟ for „third sector‟ goods? 
(Weisbrod, 1975, 1988)
Facilitating „trust‟ as means of addressing information 
asymmetries between purchasers and providers? 
(Arrow, 1963; Newhouse, 1973; Rose-Ackerman, 1996)
Eschewing profits as a „strategic tool‟? (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001)
Personal altruistic motivations? (Besley & Ghatak, 2005; 
Lakdawallah & Philipson, 2006)
POLICY
Favoured by some government funders (e.g. NZ)
• Primary Health Care Policy (2001) limited government 
funding to nonprofit firms with governance shared between 
consumer and service provider interests
• “to guard against public funds being diverted from health 
gain and health services to shareholder dividends” (Minister of 
Health, 2001:14) 
THE NONDISTRIBUTION CONSTRAINT
Speaks only to the matter of allocating operating 
surpluses (profits)
• no owners with a claim on residuals
Is silent on the matter of control exercised over firm 
assets (governance) used to generate income streams
• allocation of decision-making control likely at least as 
important to achievement of efficiency objectives than 
presence or absence of shareholding interests
• e.g. allocating profits as high salaries to those who would 
otherwise receive same proceeds as dividends
OUR PAPER
Develops framework based on competition for ownership 
of firms
Addresses
• economic rationale for firm having owners or not
• the optimal stakeholding identity (consumer or producer) of 
those owners
• competition for governance control in absence of owners
Applies the framework
• to primary health care firms generally
• the New Zealand case before and after policy change
THE FRAMEWORK
Hansmann‟s theories of ownership (1996) - endogenous
Market for ownership (inspired by Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1986)
• firm will be owned by stakeholding group whose ownership 
minimises costs of 
• ownership – co-ordinating, motivating (e.g. incentives, agency) 
• and market contracting (transaction costs, market power 
imbalances, contractual incompleteness, bounded rationality, 
holdup)
Stakeholders either
• suppliers (including labour, materials, capital – equity and debt)
• or customers
„Optimal‟ owners can change as environmental factors alter
‘NON-OWNED’ FIRMS
Will emerge endogenously when costs of maintaining a 
defined ownership stake outweigh the benefits
• control by defined ownership interests replaced by a set of 
fiduciary obligations
• fiduciary duties should favour the stakeholding group that, 
but for higher costs, would have been the defined owners
APPLICATION TO PRIMARY HEALTH CARE
Arguments for consumer ownership
• costs of market contracting – exerting information asymmetry
• patients ameliorate risk by owning firm, hiring doctors
• but how to monitor more-informed employees?
• costs of ownership
• if costs of ownership are too high for alternative owners (i.e. doctors)
• e.g. demand too low, or uncertain
• consumers assume ownership risks – e.g. fundraising, philanthropic 
donations, tax benefits 
But which patient-owners?
• a subset?
• risks of exploiting those with poor health states
• all jointly – consumer co-operative
• benefits in proportion to custom
ARGUMENTS FOR PRACTITIONER OWNERSHIP
Practitioners own and supply costly-to-contract human 
capital
• few other capital requirements
• relatively low observability, risk of reputational damage from 
financial partnership militates against equity-sharing
• observed mostly in practice - rare exceptions when other 
factors increase financial risk (e.g. capitation contracting) 
Is supplier-controlled „non-ownership‟ plausible?
• costs of ownership costs rarely prohibitive
• but observed historically – community-based care by 
missionaries, religious charities
• „livings‟
• beneficiaries powerless
WHAT ABOUT ‘MIXED’ GOVERNANCE?
The NZ policy prescription
Joint ownership typical when
• substantial exogenous uncertainty leads to risks unable to be 
anticipated or contractually allocated (e.g. exploration, R&D)
• mutual holdup of resources  not amenable to contractual 
resolution
Not clear where this could occur
• monopoly supply/monopsony purchase?
• but is mixed governance superior?
• contracting difficulties anyway
• tensions between practitioner and consumer interests likely 
costly => extreme conflict of interest w.r.t. practitioner salaries
• and mixed governance forfeits ability to use contestability to 
resolve holdup
APPLICATION TO NEW ZEALAND
Pre 2002
• dominance of sole practice general practitioners (over 90% 
market share)
• linked professionally via Independent Practitioner Associations
• practitioner-controlled co-operatives supplying support services to 
GPs as consumer-members
• but grew into service-providing entities (complementary services to 
classic GP services)
• a small number of homogeneous consumer co-operatives
• trade and student unions, Iwi (Maori) providers)
• plus a limited number of consumer-controlled nonprofit 
„trusts‟
• predominantly rural areas eschewed by private providers
POST 2002 ARRANGEMENTS
Consumer co-operatives and community nonprofits
• few barriers to becoming PHOs
General Practitioners
• could utilise existing IPA structures to form new nonprofit 
entities
• effective control remaining with practitioners, despite „mixed 
governance‟ mandate
The evidence
• 77 PHOs by 2004
• 30 community-origin, 47 practitioner-led
• community origin m/share by patient numbers 8.3%; practitioner-
led 91.7%
PHO CASE STUDIES
Howell (2005)
• large urban PHO
• effective practitioner control (2003-4 year)
• 11 trustees – 6 GPs (all IPA Directors), 2 more appointed by the 
IPA (practice nurses)
• IPA chairman is PHO chairman
Cordery (2008)
• PHO operating as wholly-owned subsidiary of IPA
• GPs contracted with the IPA which operated the PHO contract 
through a charitable trust
CONCLUSION
„Nonprofit‟ requirement offers no guarantee that „trust‟ 
can be relied upon to minimise diversion of funds 
away from health care
Markets for control of nonprofits will follow the balance 
of interests determined by the combined costs of 
ownership and market contracting
Policy implications
• better outcomes more likely to be achieved by recognising 
these pressures and altering contracts according to the 
different risks invoked by different controlling stakeholder 
interests in different circumstances
